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SYMPOSIUM, FLYING TRAMPOLINES AND FALLING
BOOKCASES: UNDERSTANDING THE THIRD
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SPRING 2010)
By Michael D. Green
Michael Green: On Monday, I was in my office. I had finished
writing my exam for my students, and I started thinking about what
I would say here and then putting together a PowerPoint
presentation—which, if I know what I’m going to say, I usually find
helpful. I don’t know if any of you read the New York Times, but
yesterday, there was a front-page article trashing PowerPoint
1
presentations. So we have General James N. Mattis, and this is a
2
We have a Four-Star
quote, “PowerPoint makes us stupid.”
General declaring that PowerPoint is dangerous. In the same New
York Times article, Brigadier General H.R. McMaster said that
3
“some problems in the world are not bullet-izable.” So I thought
about just throwing this presentation in the garbage, but then I
wouldn’t know what to say. So I’m going to hold onto it and use it
in my presentation.
For those of you who don’t know, I’ve snuck a little marketing
into the first slide—a demon deacon into here. If you know Wake
Forest University, this is our mascot, and the President of the
4
University keeps me on retainer to promote the University.
5
David really covered what’s going on in the Third
6
Restatement, which a lot of people don’t understand largely

1. Elizabeth Bumiller, We Have Met the Enemy and He Is PowerPoint, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/27
/world/27powerpoint.html.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY, http://www.wfu.edu/athletics/deacon/ (last visited
Jan. 25, 2011).
5. J. David Prince, Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.
6. Referring generally to the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for
Physical and Emotional Harm (2010). References to the “Third Restatement,”
unless otherwise made clear, herein refer to the Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm (2010).
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because it’s different from the way prior restatements have been
done. In the past, there was one person who would take on a
subject and write the entire restatement. William Prosser, back in
7
the 1950s and 1960s, did the Second Restatement of Torts. His
predecessor was a Professor at the University of Pennsylvania
School of Law named Francis Bohlen, who did the First
8
9
Restatement. When the American Law Institute (ALI) began
planning the Third Restatement, there was no one on the
contemporary torts scene like those two titans who could do the
comprehensive work that they did. That is why the Third
Restatement is being done in discrete projects, as David said. The
10
first one was Products Liability.
That was completed and
published in 1998. Apportionment of Liability was published in
11
2000. And the third project is Liability for Physical and Emotional
12
Harm that will comprise of two volumes. One was just published
13
14
in January. The second volume is waiting. And further projects
15
are contemplated, as David said.
Economic loss—these are commercial torts. These torts occur,
for example, when businesses interfere with contractual
relationships. Fraud also results in economic loss. The project to
restate this area of tort law had made significant progress and then
16
stalled when the reporter, Mark Gergen, resigned. The ALI is
trying, and has been for a while, to find another reporter to do that
17
project, which is sorely needed. And I expect we’ll see a project
7. See Herbert Wechsler, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, Introduction
(1965). References to the “Second Restatement,” unless otherwise made clear,
herein refer to the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965).
8. Referring to the Restatement (First) of Torts (1934).
9. “The American Law Institute is the leading independent organization in
the United States producing scholarly work to clarify, modernize, and otherwise
improve the law.” AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, http://www.ali.org/ (last visited Jan.
14, 2011).
10. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (1998).
11. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. (2000).
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
(2010); see also Current Projects: Restatement Third, Torts: Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction
=projects.proj_ip&projectid=16 (last visited Jan. 26, 2011).
13. Current Projects: Restatement Third, Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional
Harm, supra note 12.
14. Id.
15. J. David Prince, Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.
16. Update on ALI Tort Work, THE ALI REPORTER, http://www.ali.org/_news
/reporter/winter2008/10_ALI_Torts.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2011).
17. In the time between the presentation and publication of these comments,
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addressing damages in the future. The property torts—and today
public nuisance is a very major issue—also need a keen mind to
bring them up to date. There are a couple of courts that have
preliminarily confronted the use of public nuisance to deal with
18
global warming. So that is an area that needs attention, and it
would not surprise me if we see a project on that—not just on
nuisance, but on torts to land, including trespass—in the future.
The impact of constitutionalizing speech that harms reputation—
that is, defamation—still remains to be done, and I’m not sure this
will be completed in my lifetime. The Third Restatement is a
rolling process in which a project is identified based on input from
members, potential reporters are contacted, and a prospectus for
the project is prepared. The ALI likes to do torts projects—people
are interested in torts, they understand torts. It is also the area in
which the ALI has been most influential. Torts restatements are
19
the most cited restatement works that the Institute has done. But
for now, we’ll have to wait and see what the future holds for the
Third Restatement.
I thought I would explain a little bit of the Physical and
Emotional Harm Restatement—this project is about protecting
interests in physical integrity and emotional tranquility. That is
what it covers. We identified the interests being protected and
then worked backwards. There are other ways of organizing tort
20
law, but this is the way restatements have done it for over seventyfive years, and this is as good an organizing principle as any other.

Professor Ward Farnsworth of the Boston University School of Law has been
named as the Reporter for the Liability for Economic Loss portion of the Third
Restatement of Torts. Restatement Third, Torts: Economic Torts and Related Wrongs:
Members, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction
=projects.members&projectid=15 (last visited Jan. 26, 2011).
18. Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009), reh’g granted en
banc, 598 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 2010), appeal dismissed, 607 F.3d 1049 (5th Cir. 2010);
Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted,
131 S.Ct. 813 (2010); Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F. Supp. 2d
863 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
19. Email from Aron Goldschneider, Case Citations Director, The American
Law Institute, to Michael D. Green, Bess and Walter Williams Distinguished Chair
and Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law (Feb. 16, 2011,
15:13:34 EST) (on file with author).
20. For example, by the basis for liability—negligence, strict liability, and
intentional torts.
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In terms of the content of the Third Restatement, the first two
chapters cover intent and negligence and provide definitions of
21
those terms.
Those definitions are enduring and not terribly
different in the Third Restatement from prior versions. The Third
Restatement also covers a few of the strict liability torts, specifically
strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity and strict liability
22
for animals.
Chapter 3 is probably the most significant chapter in the
Physical and Emotional Harm Restatement; it deals with the legal
23
issues that arise in negligence.
So the questions of res ipsa
24
loquitur and the role of statutory violations are covered.
The
emergency doctrine and the standard of care to which children
25
and others with disabilities are all addressed. This is the stuff of
first-year torts.
Chapter 4 is about strict liability for abnormally dangerous
26
activities and for animals.
Chapters 5 and 6 address what we teach in law school, at least,
27
as factual cause and proximate cause. More on that later.
28
Chapter 7 is about duties to intervene and to rescue.
Infliction of emotional harm, both negligent and intentional,
29
is in Chapter 8.
And landowners’ duties are contained in the last—well, not
30
quite the last—chapter.
Chapters 1 through 9 have been approved. As David said, they
are available on Westlaw and Lexis Nexis. Chapters 1 through 6
have been published in Volume 1. Except for the fact that it
seemed a bit like show and tell in elementary school, I was going to
display Volume 1, which I brought with me. I can safely tell you
that it looks like a restatement. Chapters 6 through 9, along with

21. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§§ 1, 3 (2010).
22. Id. §§ 20, 23.
23. Id. §§ 7–19.
24. Id. §§ 16, 17.
25. Id. §§ 9, 10.
26. Id. §§ 20–25.
27. Id. §§ 26–36.
28. Id. § 40 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2010).
29. Id. §§ 45–47 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2010).
30. Id. §§ 49–54 (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2009).
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Chapter 10, which is being prepared by Ellen Pryor from SMU,
will be published as Volume 2. And that’s the reason there’s a lag
here. Ellen is in the process of preparing that additional chapter,
Chapter 10. It deals with the liability of employers of independent
contractors. So, this is the basic rule: no vicarious liability for
employers of independent contractors, but there are a number of
exceptions. And then there’s also liability for employers of
independent contractors for their own torts. So if I hire, as an
independent contractor, someone to do a dangerous task, not
paying attention to whether they’re competent to do it, I may be
liable for my own negligence in employing that independent
32
contractor. All of this will be addressed in this Chapter 10.
So, these are the essential tort concepts in physical and
emotional harm. I think if we pick out one linchpin in the Third
Restatement, it is the idea of creating a risk—that is the first
question I would ask in a tort case: Did the defendant create a risk?
When you’re driving a car, you create a risk. When you pilot an
airplane, you create a risk. When you conduct underground
excavations or manufacture a product, you create a risk. Indeed,
walking across the street creates a little bit of a risk. I’m hardpressed to identify any activity—or even non-activity—in which you
might not create some risk to others. But the first inquiry is: Have
you created a risk? If you have, then there is a presumptive duty.
That’s the point of creating a risk. Once you create a risk to others,
tort law becomes concerned and expects some attention by the
actor. Thus, there is a presumptive duty and it is the ordinary duty,
the familiar duty, of reasonable care under the circumstances.
33
That’s contained in section 7.
There are exceptions to that ordinary duty of reasonable care
34
contained in section 7(b). The Second Restatement, although its
connection with the Third Restatement has been much ignored, is
quite similar. You see the language on the slide there from the

31. Ellen Smith Pryor, Associate Provost, Homer R Mitchell Professor of Law
and University Distinguished Teaching Professor, SMU Dedman School of Law;
Current Projects: Restatement Third, Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm,
supra note 12.
32. Ellen Pryor, Restatement (Third) of Torts: Coordination and Continuation, 44
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1383, 1391 (2009).
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
7 (2010).
34. Id. § 7(b).
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35

Second Restatement. In general, anyone who does an affirmative
act is under a duty to others to exercise reasonable care. That’s
36
basically what section 7(a) of the Third Restatement says. There’s
an important caveat. There’s a hook in section 7 providing for
exceptions, contained in section 7(b). It says that in exceptional
cases, for reasons of principle or policy, a court may adopt a no37
duty or limited-duty rule. So it’s not quite a universal duty of
reasonable care when creating a risk.
For example, the issue of social host liability has been, for the
most part, not adopted to impose an obligation of the host to
38
exercise reasonable care on behalf of guests who imbibe. It just
seems to upset too much of the social interaction, conviviality, and
lubrication that we think important to us, and we’re concerned
about affecting this ordinary and common behavior. That seems to
be the reason for courts to decline to impose a duty on social hosts.
And on the few occasions when they have imposed a duty,
39
legislatures have often stepped in and overturned those decisions.
So a court would be free under the Third Restatement to say social
host liability upsets too much of ordinary social behavior. We are
not going to adopt a duty of reasonable care when it comes to
40
social hosts—that is the import of section 7(b).

35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 cmt. a (1965) (“In general,
anyone who does an affirmative act is under a duty to others to exercise the care of
a reasonable man . . . .”).
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) of TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
7(a) (“An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor’s
conduct creates a risk of physical harm.”).
37. Id. § 7(b) (“In exceptional cases, when an articulated countervailing
principle or policy warrants denying or limiting liability in a particular class of
cases, a court may decide that the defendant has no duty or that the ordinary duty
of reasonable care requires modification.”).
38. Diane Schmauder Kane, Annotation, Social Host’s Liability for Death or
Injuries Incurred by Person to Whom Alcohol Was Served, 54 A.L.R. 5th 313 (1997) (“For
the most part, the courts have been in agreement that a social host cannot be held
liable for the injury or death of an adult guest to whom intoxicating beverages
were furnished under either a common-law negligence theory or an averment that
the host’s act of serving the adult guest constituted wanton and reckless
misconduct.”).
39. See MARC A. FRANKLIN, ROBERT L. RABIN & MICHAEL D. GREEN, TORT LAW
AND ALTERNATIVES 187 (8th ed. 2006).
40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) of TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
7(b) (2010) (allowing the modification of ordinary duty of reasonable care if a
“countervailing principle or policy” warrants it).
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Suppose that the defendant did not create a risk; remember, I
said the central matter here is creation of risk. Well, Chapter 7
41
begins with the proposition that there is no duty to rescue. That is
familiar enough; there is no duty to rescue if you don’t create a
risk. And then there are exceptions to that principle of no duty to
42
rescue contained in Chapter 7.
The primary ones are special
relationships—and I’ll mention a little bit more about that later.
The role of foreseeability in duty determinations is probably
the most controversial provision in this Third Restatement, I
43
think. The Third Restatement forcefully asserts that when courts
44
analyze duty, they should do it on a categorical basis. Courts are
making law when they issue no-duty or duty rulings. This is a
matter of law, and it lays down precedent for future cases. The
existence of duty should not be based on the specific facts of the
case. Specific facts of the case are for the jury to decide, not for the
court. Of course, courts are always free—as they have been since
the Supreme Court of the Garden of Eden—to declare that the
facts are such that no reasonable jury could find otherwise. That’s
not a no-duty ruling; that is a ruling that, as a matter of law, there is
no negligence because no reasonable jury could find otherwise.
The Third Restatement goes to some pains to distinguish those two
devices—no duty and no negligence, no breach as a matter of law.
What the Third Restatement says is that foreseeability is always
context-specific and cannot be formulated on a categorical basis.
To put it another way, consider the challenge I put to my students:
Give me a category; a category that might be subject to a no-duty
ruling. And if I cannot construct facts within that category that
both create low-risk situations and high-risk situations, if I cannot
do that for any category you identify, I’ll buy you a free lunch. So
far I have not paid off, although one student came to me two years
ago with a category that had me concerned. “Blackwater,” she said,

41. Id. § 37 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005) (“An actor whose conduct has
not created a risk of physical harm to another has no duty of care to the other
unless a court determines that one of the affirmative duties provided in §§ 38–44 is
applicable.”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) of TORTS § 37 cmt. e (2010) (Proposed Final
Draft No. 1, 2005) (discussing the rationale for the no duty to rescue rule).
42. Id. §§ 38–44 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
43. Id. § 7 cmt. j.
44. Id. (“The extent of foreseeable risk depends on the specific facts of the
case and cannot be usefully assessed for a category of cases. . . . Thus, for reasons
explained in Comment i, courts should leave such determinations to juries unless
no reasonable person could differ on the matter.”).
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“the company that provided private security for government
officials in Iraq. Okay, Professor Green, how about the sort of
private security provided in war zones by companies like
Blackwater?” The Blackwater operations were her challenge,
leaving me to construct hypotheticals with a high and low degree of
risk within that category. And, of course, the difficulty there was
coming up with a factual scenario that was low risk. That was a
challenge. I finally scrambled to safety and avoided having to
concede my student had won. I said, “Okay. Blackwater has a
training facility in the mountains of North Carolina. And they
need to equip the facility, and to do so they are buying mattresses
to supply the training facility.” I said, “I don’t see much risk in
buying mattresses for a training facility.” With that response, I
managed to preserve my record of never having to pay off a free
lunch on that challenge.
Many courts rely on foreseeability for duty purposes. They like
the flexibility it gives them to rule dispositively in a case. But the
Restatement position on this is that using foreseeability just
obscures what is truly going on. If a court is going to rule that
there is no duty here, explain the basis for it. Give us the reason.
Remember section 7(b); we need alcohol in social relations without
45
liability. But don’t use foreseeability to do it. Recently, there was
one courageous court, I can say, that was willing to sacrifice and
give up the security blanket of foreseeability. That was the Iowa
46
Supreme Court last November in Thompson v. Kaczinski, in which
Justice Daryl Hecht said, in effect: “Yes, we’re going to break our
addiction to foreseeability. We’re not going to use it in the future
47
for duty purposes. We have kicked the habit.” We’ll have to see
48
how many courts are able to do that in the future.
45. Id. § 7 cmt. a (discussing how courts sometimes modify the ordinary duty
of reasonable care in circumstances where a social host serves alcohol and his or
her guests subsequently drive).
46. 774 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 2009); see also Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228 (Ariz.
2007) (citing positively to and adopting the Third Restatement’s approach to duty
determination by eliminating a foreseeability inquiry); Behrendt v. Gulf
Underwriters Ins. Co., 768 N.W.2d 568 (Wis. 2009) (same). But see Riedel v. ICI
Americas Inc., 968 A.2d 17 (Del. 2009) (declining to adopt any sections of the
Third Restatement).
47. Thompson, 774 N.W.2d at 835–36.
48. Since the time of this conference, the Nebraska Supreme Court also
decided to banish considerations of foreseeability in determining duty. The court
emphasized that foreseeability remained important in a tort case, but for purposes
of breach rather than duty. See A.W. v. Lancaster County Sch. Dist. 0001, 784
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I should add that there is a wonderful article that was written
by a student here at William Mitchell about this issue in the context
of a recent Minnesota Supreme Court decision. Maija Varda wrote
49
on Foss v. Kincade, and she did a magnificent job of critiquing the
50
court’s decision.
One of the things that the Third Restatement does is to
separate factual cause from proximate cause. Section 29 explains
51
the rationale for this cleavage. Often in a case, only one or the
other is at issue. Why should we combine them and have to deal
with both when only one is at issue? This separation enables us to
focus on what is truly at issue. It then enables clear and more
focused analysis of the one issue that is at stake. And finally, it
seeks to avoid use of the word “cause” for purposes of dealing with
52
what is known as “proximate cause.”
The Third Restatement
adopts new language, employing “scope of liability” to replace
53
proximate cause.
Scope of liability is what proximate cause is
really about. This issue arises when the defendant has been
negligent, the defendant’s negligence has caused harm, but
nevertheless we are not going to subject the defendant to liability
because liability simply can’t extend forever.
So scope of liability seems like a more accurate term to use
than proximate cause. Proximate cause confuses juries. There was
a study conducted about what juries hear and understand when
they’re told about proximate cause, and many jurors thought it was
54
about an approximate cause. Well, that doesn’t really quite do it
to inform the jury of the task at hand. It is not about proximity, it
is not about cause, it is about where we’re going to say “This is the
line we’re going to draw on the extent of liability and beyond that
we will not hold a defendant liable.” We’ll see whether the scope of
N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 2010).
49. 766 N.W.2d 317 (Minn. 2009).
50. Maija Liisa Varda, Note, Torts: Childproofing the Gate to Landowner Liability:
How Judges Misuse the Concept of Foreseeability to Keep Cases from the Jury–Foss ex rel.
Foss v. Kincade, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 354 (2009).
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
29 cmt. b (2010).
52. Id.
53. Id. § 6.
54. Robert P. Charrow & Veda R. Charrow, Making Legal Language
Understandable: A Psycholinguistic Study of Jury Instructions, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1306,
1353 (1979) (“[T]he term ‘proximate cause’ was misunderstood by 23% of the
subjects in Experiment I. They interpreted it as ‘approximate cause,’ ‘estimated
cause,’ or some fabrication.”).
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55

liability language is attractive to courts and gets adopted or not.
Factual causation is straightforward. Section 26 adopts a “but-for”
56
standard. There’s really no way to do factual cause without that
concept. We’ve been dazed and confused with the substantial
57
factor test for way too long.
58
Section 27 addresses multiple sufficient causes. Remember in
your law school torts class, your professor used the hypothetical of
two negligently and independently started fires.
They join
together, and they burn down plaintiff’s house. Did D1 cause the
destruction of the house? Well, no, because it would have
happened to the house anyway due to D2’s fire. Did D2 cause the
destruction of the house? Well, no, because it would have
happened anyway due to D1’s fire. So we’re left with the
conclusion that nobody caused the destruction of the house even
though there is a pile of ashes there. And, of course, this is the
classic situation where both fires were of tortious origin. It makes
no sense, we might say, that because of the other tortious conduct,
the complementary tort is not a cause. Section 27 addresses this
59
issue.
This issue was actually the primary purpose of the
60
substantial-factor standard in the Second Restatement, and the
Third Restatement reaches the same result but does it without
61
employing substantial-factor terminology.
Likewise, substantial
factor is rejected for use either in section 26 on factual cause, or in

55. One should be modest in their expectations about the Institute’s ability to
change usage. The first two restatements of torts used “legal cause” to encompass
both factual cause and proximate cause. As the Third Restatement reports, the
effort to embed legal cause in torts terminology failed. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM ch. 6 (2010). Yet, despite having
just been published (although the approved final draft had been around for
several years), the scope of liability language has already been explicitly adopted
by one state supreme court, for its application see Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774
N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 2009), and employed by several others. See, e.g., Reiswerg v.
Statom, 926 N.E.2d 26 (Ind. 2010); Leavitt v. Brockton Hosp., Inc., 907 N.E.2d 213
(Mass. 2009).
56. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
26 (2010).
57. See Jane Stapleton, Legal Cause: Cause-in-Fact and the Scope of Liability for
Consequences, 54 VAND. L. REV. 941, 972–78 (2001).
58. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM. §
27 (2010).
59. Id.
60. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) & cmt. d (1965).
61. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM. §
27 (2010).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss3/10

10

Green et al.: Symposium, Flying Trampolines and Falling Bookcases: Understandin

2011]

TORTS SYMPOSIUM

1021

62

section 29 on scope of liability. The test for scope of liability is not
whether the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing
the harm. So we see substantial factor relegated to the dustbin of
history.
I acknowledge that substantial factor is often used and quite
popular. I see Minnesota cases in which substantial factor is used
63
for cause in fact, as it was in a 2008 case. But two years earlier, in
64
2006, in Lietz v. Northern States Power Co., it was used to mean scope
of liability. That confuses me, and, when I am confused, I am
unhappy. I like to have neat categories and boxes that deal with
the elements of a tort case. When they start leaking between each
other, that upsets my brain. Doing away with substantial factor and,
I might add, proximate cause, should increase happiness among
those who, like me, prefer conceptual clarity.
I think I said that foreseeability as an aspect of duty was the
most controversial issue in the Third Restatement. I now think that
65
is wrong. I think it was actually section 28, comment c that was
the most controversial. I know one of our panelists here would
66
agree with me, right Hildy? This comment was difficult to do. It
was very controversial. Fortunately, we got help in the process of
doing this; a member of the ALI said, “You know, maybe we should
ask some scientists, because this, after all, is about scientific proof.
Neither Green nor Bill Powers [my co-reporter at the time] are
scientists. And the members of the ALI are lawyers, not scientists.”
So we had a wonderful day at the National Academy of Sciences.
They brought in a variety of scientists—toxicologists,
epidemiologists, and a doctor, I think. We went through the draft
comment c and listened to their comments, criticisms, and
suggestions. It was a very enlightening and helpful session. This is
probably the longest comment that the ALI ever placed in a
restatement. It attempts to provide a framework for proving
causation in cases that involve toxic substances, and you see on the
slide above the five subsections that are contained in this

62. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§§ 26 cmt. j, 29 cmt. a (2010).
63. Osborne v. Twin Town Bowl, Inc., 749 N.W.2d 367, 375–76 (Minn. 2008).
64. 718 N.W.2d 865, 872 (Minn. 2006).
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
28 cmt. c (2010).
66. Hildy Bowbeer, Flying Trampolines and Falling Bookcases: Understanding the
Third Restatement of Torts (Spring 2010), 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1034 (2011).
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67

comment. Also, in the reporters’ notes, we try to cite the major
68
cases that have been influential in this area. There is no provision
69
on toxic substance causation in the Second Restatement. This is
really a product of an area of torts that has developed in the years
since the Second Restatement was published.
Let me address the intersection of toxic substance causation
and the multiple sufficient causes that we discussed earlier.
Consider this hypothetical: There is a car parked on the edge of a
parking lot on the top of a cliff. It’s a lookout point. And three
people lean on the parked car. The force of the three people starts
the car rolling and it goes over the cliff. The pressure from any two
of those persons would have been enough to send the car over the
cliff. One person’s force, however, would not. So, it takes two. Is
each or any of those three persons a cause of the car’s destruction?
C says “it was A and B, not me.” B says, “no, it’s A and C.” And A
says B and C. You can see this is an expansion of the two fires
hypothetical. This is with three tortious actors. This issue exists to
a large extent today in asbestos litigation, although it is rarely
recognized as such.
It exists in asbestos litigation because
employees over a lifetime are exposed to more asbestos than the
threshold required for contracting asbestotic disease. Thus, what
we’re seeing is litigation over whether exposure to a little bit of a
given defendant’s asbestos was a “substantial factor” in the
plaintiff’s asbestotic disease. So there are these cases around the
country where somebody worked with defendant’s asbestos for
three days out of thirty years.
70
Section 29, which deals with scope of liability, says that if
there is minimal contribution in this multiple sufficient cause
situation—if we have one person contributing one-hundred
percent of the force required to push the car over the cliff, and
another
person
contributes
one
percent—well,
it’s
overdetermined. We could take the small contribution and say
we’re not going to impose liability here. And section 29 does
that—when the contribution to an overdetermined causal situation
is trivial, section 29 says that defendant’s conduct is not within the

67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
28 cmt. c (2010).
68. Id. § 28 cmt. c reporters’ note.
69. Referring generally to the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965).
70. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
29 (2010).
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71

scope of liability. In the Second Restatement that was another use
of substantial factor, and the Third Restatement reaches the same
result, but does it as a matter of scope of liability rather than as a
72
matter of causation and substantial factor.
There are some new special relationships in the affirmative
duties. You probably recall the psychotherapist in Tarasoff v.
73
Regents of the University of California, which has become a classic
torts case.
The Tarasoff case occurred after the Second
Restatement and was widely followed by many other state supreme
courts.
The Second Restatement says nothing about
psychotherapists, patients, or a duty to third persons when the
patient reveals that he or she has violent tendencies that threaten
74
that third person. The modernizing of the restatement to reflect
75
this development is contained in Chapter 7.
Schools and students have emerged in the last forty years as
another relationship imposing an affirmative duty on schools with
regard to their students’ safety. Sometimes it is as property owners
when they are renting dormitory space to students. Sometimes it’s
simply as students.
But the student-school relationship is
76
recognized in Chapter 7 as justifying an affirmative duty.
77
Finally, in this Chapter there is an open-ended comment that
might accommodate a case like, and I don’t know how to
pronounce the plaintiff’s name. Do you have any better idea?
Bjerke??
Scandinavian I am not, so I always have trouble
78
pronouncing such names. But Bjerke v. Johnson is a case in which a
woman agreed to have an adolescent live with her, agreed to look
after this adolescent, and told the parents that she would act as a
79
surrogate parent.
In this case, the Minnesota Supreme Court
recognized an affirmative duty on the part of the surrogate
80
parent. The suit arose because the adolescent then ended up in a
71.
72.

Id.
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2) cmt. d (1965), with
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 29
(2010).
73. 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
74. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
75. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
40 (2010).
76. Id.
77. Id. at cmt. o.
78. 742 N.W.2d 669 (Minn. 2007).
79. Id. at 664–65.
80. Id. at 667.
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sexual relationship (with the boyfriend of the surrogate parent)
that was plainly inappropriate, and the question was whether the
surrogate parent had a duty to protect her charge in that
81
situation.
So there are a couple of open-ended comments that say maybe
relationships such as this might be the basis for future recognition
82
of special relationships imposing a duty of care. Maybe in the
Fourth Restatement of Torts, we will see coalescence over some
family relationships resulting in a duty of reasonable care to protect
another family member.
Let me stop at this point. We can talk about negligent and
intentional infliction of emotional distress during the question and
answer period if there are audience members who would like to do
that. What I want to avoid is the fate of the speaker who continued
on well past the allocated time, droning beyond any reasonable
period. And then as he quit, he apologized and said, “I’m sorry,
but I can’t see the clock on the back of the wall.” At which point a
disgruntled member of the audience said, “Yes, but can’t you see
the calendar?”
Thank you very much. I look forward to listening to other
speakers during the remainder of the program.

81. Id. at 665.
82. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
40 cmt. o (2010).
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SYMPOSIUM, FLYING TRAMPOLINES AND FALLING
BOOKCASES: UNDERSTANDING THE THIRD
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SPRING 2010)
By Justice Daryl Hecht
1

David Prince : Our next speaker is Justice Daryl Hecht from
the Iowa Supreme Court, another Iowa influence. Justice Hecht is
a native of northwestern Iowa. He got his undergraduate degree
from Morningside College in Sioux City and his law degree from
the University of South Dakota, and practiced law in my home
town, Sioux City, for over twenty years before he was appointed to
2
the Iowa Court of Appeals in 1999, and has been on the supreme
3
court since 2006. One of the things that always impresses me is
people who make the commitment in their hearts and minds and
then take the time to go back to school and pursue a degree when
they’re well into their professional career. And Justice Hecht also
4
has an LL.M. from the University of Virginia that he received
about five or six years ago.
Justice Hecht is the author of the Iowa Supreme Court’s
5
opinion in Thompson v. Kaczinski, a case that Mike Green
6
mentioned, in which that court adopted the position taken in
7
section 7 of the Third Restatement of Torts to leave foreseeability
1. J. David Prince, Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.
2. See SUPREME COURT, http://www.iowacourtsonline.org/Supreme_Court
/Justices/Daryl_L_Hecht/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2011).
3. Id.
4. An LL.M. is an abbreviation for a Master of Laws Degree. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 434 (3rd pocket ed. 2006). A Master of Laws Degree is a “degree
conferred on those completing graduate-level legal study, beyond the J.D. or
LL.B.” Id. at 450.
5. 774 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 2009).
6. See Michael D. Green, Flying Trampolines and Falling Bookcases:
Understanding the Third Restatement of Torts (Spring 2010), 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1011 (2011).
7. The Restatement says:
(a) An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the
actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm.
(b) In exceptional cases, when an articulated countervailing principle or
policy warrants denying or limiting liability in a particular class of cases, a

1025
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as a consideration in determining the duty question.
Judge, again, thank you so much for taking a day to come up
and join us; I’ll be very interested to hear your perspectives on
these issues.
Justice Hecht: Thank you David for that kind introduction.
It’s actually a great pleasure for me to be here this morning. The
work of an appellate judge tends to be rather solitary, and unlike
professors who get to come to class and have regular interchanges
with students or lawyers who constantly have interactions with
clients and other lawyers and judges, appellate judges can spend
most of their time reading and writing, largely by themselves. And
so it’s really fun for me to get out from time to time and have
interactions with folks in this kind of setting.
I commend the law school for sponsoring this interesting
symposium on the Third Restatement. It’s my view that the
9
Restatement (Third) on Physical and Emotional Harm represents
an outstanding piece of scholarship and I hope that you will find
our discussion today informative and useful. As the case of
10
Thompson v. Kaczinski is the main reason Professor Prince invited
me to speak here today, I’ll turn immediately to a discussion of the
case.
Pastor Thompson was driving to church one Sunday morning
about 9:30 and as he crested a hill on a gravel road, he noticed and
11
swerved to avoid a large object on the roadway. He lost control of

court may decide that the defendant has no duty or that the ordinary
duty of reasonable care requires modification.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 (2010).
References to the “Third Restatement,” unless otherwise made clear, herein refer
to the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm
(2010).
8. See Thompson, 774 N.W.2d at 835. The Third Restatement omits
foreseeability when discussing the duty analysis:
(a) An actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the
actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm.
(b) In exceptional cases, when an articulated countervailing principle or
policy warrants denying or limiting liability in a particular class of cases, a
court may decide that the defendant has no duty or that the ordinary
duty of reasonable care requires modification.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 7 (2010).
9. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM (2010).
10. 774 N.W.2d 829 (Iowa 2009).
11. Id. at 831.
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12

the vehicle he was driving. The car veered into the ditch, and
13
Thompson was badly injured. The object on the roadway was, in
fact, the top of a trampoline owned by James Kaczinski and
Michelle Lockwood, whose residential property abutted the gravel
14
road and sat right at the top of this hill.
Discovery responses in the case revealed that Kaczinski and
Lockwood had disassembled their trampoline and placed its
component parts on their yard, approximately forty feet from the
15
road just a few weeks before the crash. On the evening before
Pastor Thompson came by, a rain storm with relatively high winds
blew through the area and displaced the top of the trampoline
16
from the yard to the surface of the road. The following morning,
Kaczinski and Lockwood were awakened by Pastor Thompson’s
17
screams for help.
Pastor Thompson and his wife then sued Kaczinski and
Lockwood alleging that the defendants’ breach of statutory and
common law duties caused severe physical injury to Pastor
18
Thompson resulting in loss of consortium to his wife.
The
statutory duty alleged by the plaintiffs was based on an Iowa statute,
section 318.3, which provides “a person shall not place or cause to
be placed an obstruction within any highway right-of-way” or an
impediment or hindrance which impedes, opposes, or interferes
19
with free passage along the highway right-of-way.
The defendants filed an answer, of course, denying negligence
20
and soon thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment. In
their motion, the defendants asserted that they owed no duty to the
plaintiffs, because the wind’s displacement of the top of the
21
trampoline to the surface of the roadway was not foreseeable.
I’ll now refer briefly to the district court’s summary judgment
ruling. The court concluded that the defendants owed neither a
statutory nor a common law duty to the plaintiffs under the
22
First, the court reasoned that the statute only
circumstances.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id. at 832.
Id. at 831.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 832.
Id.
IOWA CODE § 318.3 (2010).
Thompson, 774 N.W.2d at 832.
Id.
Id.
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proscribes the intentional placement of obstructions on the
roadway, and as the defendants didn’t intend to put their
trampoline on the top of the roadway, the court believed no duty
23
arose under the statute. Second, the court concluded that the
defendants owed no common law duty because the wind’s
displacement of the trampoline to the roadway was not
24
foreseeable.
And although the defendants didn’t claim
entitlement to summary judgment on the ground of causation, the
district court’s summary judgment ruling nonetheless resolved that
issue as a matter of law against the plaintiffs on the same
25
foreseeability ground.
So the plaintiffs brought their appeal and we—the supreme
court—transferred the case, as we do most of the cases appealed to
26
the Iowa Supreme Court, to the court of appeals for a decision.
The court of appeals affirmed and we then granted the plaintiffs’
27
application for further review.
In our decision that was filed on November 13 of last year, we
addressed three issues. First, relative to the statutory duty question,
did the district court err in concluding the defendants owed no
28
duty under the statute?
Second, did the district court err in
concluding that the defendants owed Pastor Thompson no
29
common law duty of reasonable care under circumstances? And
finally, the third issue, did the district court err in resolving the
causation question as a matter of law at the summary judgment
30
stage?
I’ll discuss briefly each of those issues and our court’s
resolution.
First, with the respect to the statutory duty, we interpreted the
statute as a prohibition of only intentional placement of
31
obstructions along roadways. And I realize our analysis of that
issue really isn’t germane to the discussion here this morning, so
I’ll simply note that we concluded the statutory framework which
authorized criminal sanctions for the placement of obstructions
signaled the legislation’s intention that only intentional conduct
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Id. at 835.
Id. at 836.
Id. at 832.
Id.
Id. at 832–34.
Id. at 834–36.
Id. at 836–40.
Id. at 832.
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32

was proscribed by the statute. And so we affirmed the district
court’s ruling that the statutory basis for the claimed duty did not
33
exist.
Next, with respect to the common law duty question, we first
noted that our prior decisions had included the concept of
foreseeability as an important feature of the common law duty
34
analysis.
We quickly turned our attention, however, to the
proposed final draft, number 1, section 7(a) of the Third
35
Restatement.
This section, as Professor Green has already
36
indicated, at least from my analysis, establishes what I describe as a
default position for the analysis of common law duty in negligence
37
cases alleging physical injury. The default position is that “an
actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the
38
actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm.” On this default
position, courts need not concern themselves with the existence or
content of this ordinary duty in most cases involving physical
39
harm.
This general duty of reasonable care is displaced or modified,
as has already been noted, under the Third Restatement
formulation only in exceptional cases. An exceptional case,
according to the drafters, is one in which “an articulated
countervailing principle or policy warrants denying or limiting
40
liability in a particular class of cases.” When a court wishes to limit
liability for conduct based on principle or policy, it can do so in the
duty analysis, and duty is usefully employed if a court seeks to make
a general pronouncement about when actors may, or on the other
41
hand, may not be liable.
Most importantly, in my view, the
drafters noted that reasons of policy and principles justifying a
departure from the general duty to exercise reasonable care do not
depend on the foreseeability of harm, based on the specific facts of

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 833–34.
Id. at 834.
See id.
Id. at 834; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL &
EMOTIONAL HARM § 7(a) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
36. See supra note 33 and accompanying text; Green, supra note 6.
37. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 7(a) (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
38. Id.
39. See id.
40. Id. § 7(b).
41. See id. § 7 cmt. a.
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42

a case. Simply put, when departing from the general duty because
of a principle or policy, the drafters caution courts against using
43
foreseeability as an analytical criterion.
So in Thompson v. Kaczinski, the Iowa Supreme Court
concluded that the Thompson case didn’t fall within a particular
class of cases for which a countervailing principle or policy
warranted denying or limiting the landowner’s duty to exercise
44
reasonable care. I emphasize at this juncture that our court’s
decision in Thompson, reversing the district court’s conclusion that
the landowners owed no common law duty because the hazard was
45
not foreseeable, should not be viewed as a determination that the
significance of foreseeability has been diminished in the
determination of tort liability for physical injuries in Iowa.
Foreseeability, of course, remains a crucial element in the analysis
46
of whether the general duty has been breached, and in the
determination of whether the harm claimed by the plaintiff is
47
within the scope of liability.
I’ll now turn to the third issue in the Thompson case, which
involves the scope of liability. As I noted earlier, the district court
concluded in its summary judgment ruling that the defendants
were entitled to summary judgment under the then-prevailing
48
principles of proximate cause, concluding that the displacement
of the trampoline from the yard to the roadway was not
49
foreseeable. The court concluded that any breach of duty on the
part of the landowners wasn’t the legal cause of the passenger’s
50
injuries. And that, of course, as I suggested, was consistent with
51
the proximate cause analysis in our earlier cases.
But our court, the Iowa Supreme Court, took issue with the
district court’s conclusion on causation as well. We began our
discussion of the causation question by reviewing the Iowa
precedent, which was based on Restatement (Second) of Torts

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. § 7 cmt. j.
Id.
774 N.W.2d 829, 835 (Iowa 2009).
Id. at 836.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB.
HARM § 3 (2010).
47. See id. § 29 cmt. d.
48. Thompson, 774 N.W.2d at 836.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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52

(Second Restatement), section 431. You’ll recall that the standard
stated in section 431 and related sections, established that legal
causation requires a determination of (1) whether the defendant’s
conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and
(2) whether there’s a rule of law relieving the defendant from
53
liability. In our discussion of Thompson, we noted that the Second
Restatement framework for analysis of legal causation has been
criticized because it blends factual determinations—that is,
whether the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in
bringing about the harm—with policy judgments—that is, whether
54
there’s a rule of law precluding liability.
The Iowa Supreme Court’s opinion in Thompson acknowledged
that the court’s prior decisions in this area had applied the legal
causation framework quite unevenly in the past as part of the
55
proximate cause analysis.
Attributing this inconsistency of our
proximate cause analysis to the confusing nature of the standard
rather than to a lack of mental acuity of the justices, we looked to
the Third Restatement in an effort to clarify this area of Iowa law.
In our opinion in Thompson, we jettisoned the confusing vernacular
of proximate cause and adopted the Restatement’s formulation of
56
scope of liability.
On this formulation, the concept of factual
causation is separated from the policy consideration of whether the
law should attach legal liability to a particular act or omission.
Under the Third Restatement scope of liability formulation, an
actor’s liability is, as has already been noted, limited to those
physical harms that result from the risks that made the actor’s
57
conduct tortious. This principle, referred to as the risk standard,
is intended to prevent the unjustified imposition of liability by
confining liability’s scope to the reasons for holding the actor liable
58
in the first place.

52. Thompson, 774 N.W.2d at 836–37.
53. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431 (1965); accord Kelly v. Sinclair Oil
Corp., 476 N.W.2d 341, 349 (Iowa 1991).
54. Thompson, 774 N.W.2d at 836.
55. Id.
56. See id. at 837–39.
57. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
29 (2010).
58. Id. § 29 cmt. d.
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The Third Restatement drafters make it clear that scope of
liability is to be treated as a question of fact for the fact-finder, and
59
this has already been mentioned.
When the limits of liability
imposed require careful attention to the specific facts of the case
and difficult, often amorphous, evaluative judgments for which a
modest difference in the factual circumstances may change the
outcome, the scope of liability is a more flexible and preferable
device than duty for placing limits on liability. And that, I think, is
a very, very sound analysis and one of the primary reasons why our
court was convinced to make this change.
The scope of liability issue is fact-intensive, as it requires
consideration of the risks that made the actor’s conduct tortious
and a determination of whether the harm at issue is a result of any
60
of those risks. When a defendant challenges the plaintiff’s claim
on scope of liability grounds before trial, the court must initially
consider all of the range of harms risked by the defendant’s
conduct that the jury could find as a basis for determining the
defendant’s conduct tortious. The court then must compare the
plaintiff’s harm with the range of harm risked by the defendant’s
conduct to determine whether a reasonable jury might find the
61
plaintiff’s harm was within that range.
In Thompson, the Iowa Supreme Court concluded at the
summary judgment stage that a reasonable juror could find the
harm suffered by Pastor Thompson was within the range of harms
risked by the defendant’s conduct in leaving the disassembled and
untethered components of the trampoline on the yard near the
62
roadway. Put another way, the court concluded a reasonable factfinder could find it was reasonably foreseeable that a top of a
disassembled, untethered trampoline might become airborne like a
frisbee in the wind and be deposited on the surface of the nearby
road, causing a hazard for motorists.
It was, therefore, the function of the jury to determine
whether the harm was within the defendants’ scope of liability. We,
therefore, reversed the district court’s summary judgment ruling
63
and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. It
remains, of course, to be seen if the Thompson case is tried, whether
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id.
See id.
Id.
See Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774 N.W.2d 829, 839 (Iowa 2009).
Id. at 840.
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the fact-finder will (1) find a breach of the general duty of care,
and (2) find that the plaintiffs’ harm was within the range of harms
risked by the defendants’ conduct.
In my view, the Restatement (Third) formulations of duty and
scope of liability will make analysis of tort law easier for courts,
attorneys, and jurors. Now there is really no need to complicate
the duty analysis with foreseeability, as that concept is more than
adequately covered in the analysis of breach and scope of liability.
And the retention of the concept of foreseeability in those two
determinations, the breach and scope of liability endeavors,
preserves for the court sufficient flexibility to resolve cases which
can be resolved as a matter of law because there is no legitimate
fact question for resolution by the fact-finder.
There will be an adjustment period for Iowa trial courts and
attorneys as they develop the pattern jury instructions to comport
with the principles announced in the Third Restatement and
adopted in our Thompson decision. And I’m sure there will be a
period of frustration as lawyers get used to this new formulation.
But I think once we’re passed that period of adjustment, Iowa
courts and attorneys will agree that the Third Restatement
formulation of duty and scope of liability will make life easier.
Thank you. It’s been a pleasure to be here.
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SYMPOSIUM, FLYING TRAMPOLINES AND FALLING
BOOKCASES: UNDERSTANDING THE THIRD
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SPRING 2010)
By Justice Paul H. Anderson
1

Justice Anderson: Thank you, David, for that nice
introduction. It is a pleasure to be here with you at William
Mitchell Law School this morning for your symposium on the
Restatement of Torts. I regret that I was unable to be here for the
first part of the symposium, but our court held Special Term this
morning. Like so many things these days, the issues before us were
complicated, so it took longer than I expected. Unfortunately, I
2
did not have a chance to hear Mike Steenson’s comments on our
court’s jurisprudence in the area of product liability, tort law, and
in particular, on falling bookcases. Thus, I feel a little bit behind
the eight-ball because I have not had the complete context of
previous speakers’ remarks.
Because of this circumstance, my presentation will not be
overly case-specific. Rather, I hope to give you some insight into
how judges look at the Restatement of Torts. Here, of course, I will
3
be talking about the Third Restatement because in most instances,
it is the most recent Restatement. But there will be some crossover
4
between the Third Restatement and the Second Restatement
5
because the Third Restatement is a work in progress. It is a work
6
in progress that has been going on for almost two decades.
1. J. David Prince, Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.
2. Michael K. Steenson, Professor of Law, Kelly Chair in Tort Law, William
Mitchell College of Law.
3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
(2010).
4. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965).
5. Current Projects―Restatement Third, Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional
Harm, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, http://www.ali.org/index.cfm?fuseaction
=projects.proj_ip&projectid=16 (last visited Feb. 3, 2011) (“The second volume,
dealing with affirmative duties, emotional harm, landowner liability, and liability
of actors who retain independent contractors, is expected to be published in late
2011.”).
6. See THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PAST AND PRESENT ALI PROJECTS 1
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The questions I have been asked to address are—how do
judges look at the Restatement? Do we find it useful, or is it, at
worst, mostly irrelevant, or at best, of marginal assistance to us? To
begin with, we as appellate judges must always first look to our own
law as precedent. We are bound by our precedent and must treat
any deviation from our precedent quite gingerly. As a state court,
we also look to the United States Supreme Court’s precedent. We
look to the Supreme Court precedent on matters that fall under
the U.S. Constitution because that Court has the final say under the
Federal Constitution. But lawyers should be aware that in
Minnesota, like all other states, we have our own constitution, so we
will go to our own state constitution when we deem it necessary and
appropriate to do so.
There are occasions when, after looking at what the U.S.
Supreme Court has said, we conclude that we will not follow that
Court but rather look to our own constitution and our own case
law. For more specific information on when we will look to our
own constitution, I refer you to a recent law review article that I co7
authored with St. Thomas Law School Professor Julie Oseid. The
article is called, A Decision Tree Takes Root in the Land of 10,000 Lakes:
Minnesota’s Approach to Protecting Individual Rights Under Both the
United States and Minnesota Constitutions. The article appears in
Volume 70 of the Albany Law Review at page 865, and was published
8
in 2007.
In the Albany Law Review article, I note that the Supreme Court
9
sometimes changes its own jurisprudence. The question then
arises, how do we as a state supreme court deal with such changes?
A few years ago, this topic came up at a seminar where a prominent
federal circuit court judge told those of us on state supreme courts
that we must learn to adjust to the current change in Supreme
Court precedent. In essence, the judge said—live with it. He said
the reality of the current legal/judicial landscape is that the
Supreme Court has changed, and we need to follow its lead. At this
point, I raised my hand in response to these comments and
(2010) available at http://www.ali.org/doc/past_present_ALIprojects.pdf (listing
the date range for the Products Liability portions of the Third Restatement of
Torts as “1991–1998”).
7. Julie Oseid, Associate Professor, University of St. Thomas School of Law.
8. Paul H. Anderson & Julie A. Oseid, A Decision Tree Takes Root in the Land of
10,000 Lakes: Minnesota’s Approach to Protecting Individual Rights Under Both the United
States and Minnesota Constitutions, 70 ALB. L. REV. 865 (2007).
9. Id. at 866.
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essentially said the following,
Your honor, I am from Minnesota, and we have a slightly
different perspective in our state. Many of you do not
know where Minnesota is—we are that state you fly over as
you go from coast to coast. We are tucked into the north
central part of the United States. Many of you think we
are Canadians—almost, but not quite.
I then went on to give the following illustration on how we, in
Minnesota, sometimes view changes in Supreme Court precedent.
Elmer and Ethel are a retired farm couple living in west
central Minnesota.
They have recently turned the
operation of their farm over to their children. It is
Saturday afternoon, they are driving their pickup into
town where they will get some groceries and perhaps stop
at the local cafe for coffee and dessert. Elmer is behind
the steering wheel; Ethel is seated to his right, next to the
passenger door. They see a red convertible with the top
down coming from the other direction. The man and the
woman in the car are seated so close to one another that
you could not fit a blade of straw between them. Ethel
looks at the young couple and with a nostalgic tone she
says, “You know, Elmer, we used to sit like that.” Elmer
responds, “Well, Ethel, I haven’t moved, I’m still sitting
10
where I used to sit.”
The point I attempted to convey by telling this story is that
state courts are different. We have our own constitutions. We have
and are bound by our own precedent. Like Elmer, we often see
ourselves as sitting where we have been sitting for a long time.
While Supreme Court decisions have considerable sway, states have
separate constitutions and separate precedents. Thus, if the
Supreme Court acts like Ethel and moves too far to one side, we
may look to our own constitution to stay behind the wheel where
we have been sitting for decades, if not longer. As petitioners
before our court, you need to understand this important concept.
Once we get beyond the fundamental principle of following
our precedent and our constitution, the question arises as to how
we treat other legal sources—federal court decisions, other state
court decisions, commentaries, treatises, and documents such as
the restatement. Just where does the restatement fit into this
hierarchy of sources of the law? I can assure you that the
10.

See id. at 865–66.
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restatement is not at the lower rung of the hierarchy where you will
most likely find journals, articles and commentaries or even note
comments such as those that appear in the William Mitchell Law
11
Review.
The restatement is more persuasive than these other
sources. Moreover, different judges will have different perspectives
with respect to the restatement, and so to a certain extent, my
comments that follow will represent a personal perspective.
I remember when I first became an appellate judge and
particularly when I first joined our supreme court. It was during
my first year on the court when the chief justice addressed the
question of how we respond to the restatement and a party’s
argument urging us to adopt the restatement. In particular, what
do we do when facing a question of whether we will recognize a
new tort? The chief justice noted that despite what the restatement
says, we need to be very careful when and if we adopt a new tort.
Another justice echoed the same sentiment and a discussion
followed as to how courts need to move with caution as we develop
our tort law. There was further discussion to the effect that just
because something is included in the restatement, it is not
necessarily something that is the best thing for us to do. I
remember another colleague making the comment that, while the
restatement is a valuable resource, it is not necessarily the best
thing since sliced bread.
I remember my reaction to this discussion. I felt a bit in awe of
the fact that we can develop and even change our tort law, but
wondered under what circumstances we should make a change.
Also, I was proceeding tentatively because tort law had not been a
major practice area for me. This fact made me willing to defer to
my colleagues. I also remember being impressed and even
persuaded by the logic and the depth of the restatement’s analysis;
nevertheless, in the case before us that day, I ultimately came to the
conclusion that just because something is in the restatement, it did
not necessarily mean that our court should or must agree with it. I
concluded that as a supreme court exercising our sovereign power,
we needed to proceed carefully and sometimes this means that we
will go in different directions from the restatement.
As I previously noted, judges will approach the restatement
from many different perspectives. I found that out from my
experience on the court. Further, judges will most likely approach
11.

WM. MITCHELL L. REV. (1974–2011).
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the restatement differently than do members of the academy. Last
night it was interesting listening to David talk about the Third
Restatement of Torts. When David spoke, there was more than a
hint of excitement about the Restatement and what a great piece of
legal work it was and how proud he is of it. I am devoid of such
feelings because I am not so sure that the Restatement is such a
marvelous body of work. The Restatement Third does not take my
breath away. For me, it is another tool to use when looking for the
right answer to a legal question. Further, I do not look at the
Restatement as one complete body of work. There are pieces of
specific information in it that I will need on a specific occasion.
When I need this information, I will go to the restatement, but—to
put my attitude in vernacular terms—I do not genuflect when I
walk past the restatement in our library. Thus, it is necessary to
appreciate the fact that there is often a difference in perspective on
the restatement between members of the academy and members of
an appellate court.
Even on our court, we have different perspectives. I have had
colleagues who will look at the restatement and essentially
conclude that it is the best thing since sliced bread. Anytime we
have a case where the law is developing, and we find something in
the restatement that addresses the development, we can almost
always depend on having a colleague cite the restatement and say
12
that we would be wise to follow the restatement.
On the other hand, I have other colleagues who, in essence,
consider the restatement to be something drafted by a group of
pointy-headed elites who have retreated to, and are writing from,
an ivory tower. This elite group will sometimes bring “real trial
lawyers” in to consult, but it is for the most part devoid of any
connection to reality.
To these colleagues, even the term
“restatement” is a misnomer. Rather, it is a policy/advocacy
document and should be treated as such and responded to
13
accordingly.
12. See, e.g., Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 300, 306 (Minn. 2007)
(“Although we have not specifically adopted this tort, we have frequently relied on
the Restatement of Torts to guide our development of tort law.”); Hoyt Props.
Inc., v. Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C., 736 N.W.2d 313, 318, 324 (Minn. 2007)
(concluding that the representation was actionable in the case based on the
Second Restatement of Torts); Schafer v. JLC Food Sys., Inc., 695 N.W.2d 570, 575
(Minn. 2005) (adopting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIABILITY § 7
(1998)).
13. Andrew F. Popper, Restatement Third Goes to Court, 35 TRIAL 54, 55 n.5
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I have had other colleagues tell me they do not find the
restatement to be that useful. They say it is too nuanced, too
opaque, and the concepts that are contained in the restatement are
too difficult to explain to a jury. They are reluctant to adopt the
restatement language because it is so nuanced. They do not
denigrate the restatement or denigrate the people working on it.
They reject it because it is the result of compromise expressed in
convoluted language—language that breaks down when one tries
14
to translate it to Joe Mechanic who is sitting on a jury.
I tend to fall into the group that likes the restatement, but that
said, I do not think it is the best thing since sliced bread. I treat it
with a certain amount of skepticism, but I am also deferential to
and respectful of the work that has gone into drafting it. If you
read my opinions in the area of tort law, you will see that on many
15
occasions, I cite the restatement as an important authority.
The lesson you should take from my comments thus far is that
if you are arguing a case before our court, it is important to be
aware of differing positions on the restatement, and especially my
position, because I think my position tends to reflect the position
of most judges. The restatement is something that you should use,
something you use much the same way that I use case law from the
federal circuit and district courts. I often tell my clerks to look at
federal case law when they have the opportunity if the federal case
law relates to an issue before us. Federal judges generally hire
some really good law clerks who spend a significant amount of time
researching legal issues. While we are not bound by what a federal
court may say, there is often much good legal reasoning that gets
incorporated into federal opinions. Further, if a state court
opinion or commentary contains good, sound legal reasoning, I am
going to take a long, hard look at it.

(1999) (“It is important to remember that ALI is in effect a private legislature, and
its restatements are policy documents without the force of law.”).
14. See, e.g., Robert E. Keeton, Warning Defect: Origins, Policies, and Directions,
30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 367, 398 (1997) (noting that “trial courts often borrow
language from appellate opinions and from Restatements, even though appellate
opinions and Restatements have rarely been drafted with an explicit purpose of
expressing ideas in a form suitable for use in instructing a jury.”).
15. See, e.g., Swanson v. Brewster, 784 N.W.2d 264, 269 n.6 (Minn. 2010); Foss
v. Kincade, 766 N.W.2d 317, 321 (Minn. 2009); Osborne v. Twin Town Bowl, Inc.,
749 N.W.2d 367, 372 (Minn. 2008); Clifford v. Geritom Med, Inc., 681 N.W.2d
680, 684–85 (Minn. 2004).
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I look to the restatement in much the same way. It is a legal
document that has been prepared by reasonable people who have
put considerable thought into the end product. Thus, it can be
very helpful. Again, if you look at my opinions, you will see that I
16
frequently cite to the restatement. Even if I do not adopt it, I
often look to the restatement to confirm that we are correct in our
legal analysis. I use it to confirm that we have support for the
position we have either announced or affirmed.
As an example of what you should do when you have a case
where you want us to adopt the restatement, I recommend that you
17
look at a case like Schafer v. JLC Food Systems, Inc. In Schafer, a
person in a restaurant sustained an injury after swallowing part of a
18
pumpkin muffin. In our opinion, we agreed with the parties that
when the specific harm-causing object is not known, circumstantial
evidence should be available if such evidence is sufficient and other
causes are adequately eliminated for purposes of submitting an
19
issue of liability to the jury. What we did in this 2005 case was to
look at some of our jurisprudence going back to two cases that
20
21
involved Coca-Cola. We then cited the law from those cases. But
what happened next is important for you to know. We went on to
say that our prior law is consistent with the approach taken by the
22
restatement. We then put the exact wording from the restatement
23
in a footnote. That is how we used it. We first found what was
either explicit or implicit in our own case law, and then we went on
to see what the restatement said about that issue. If the
restatement provides support or direction as it did in the pumpkin
muffin case, we will cite the restatement to support the correctness
of our reasoning.
I will now review principles you must keep in mind when you
are arguing before a policy or doctrine court like our supreme
court—a court that is going to determine what the law is. From
what I have said, there are three important points that emerge.

16. See cases cited supra note 15.
17. 695 N.W.2d 570 (Minn. 2005).
18. Id. at 572.
19. Id. at 576.
20. Id. (citing Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 330–
31, 188 N.W.2d 426, 433 (1971); Holkestad v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 288 Minn.
249, 257, 180 N.W.2d 860, 865–66 (1970)).
21. Id. at 576–77.
22. Id. at 576.
23. Id. at 576 n.2.
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First, the restatement is not the Bible to us. We do not view it as
the true gospel. Just because the restatement has articulated a
principle, it is not the absolute last word for us. Second, judges are
different and you will have different judges looking at the
restatement in different ways, some with more skepticism, some
with greater acceptance. Third, the restatement can be very
helpful to you when you make an argument, and that is how you
should view it. You should submit it to us and indicate to us that it
is helpful to resolving the particular legal issue before us.
I will now give some examples of how the foregoing principles
work. We recently issued an opinion that I wrote which dealt with
24
two parties and the issue of which party had the burden of proof.
Here, the language we used with respect to who had the burden of
proof on the aggravation issue is of interest. We said:
Our holdings in Mathews and Canada by Landy are
consistent with the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which
only shifts the burden of proof to the defendant in
situations that involve the combined tortious conduct of
two or more actors who are seeking to limit their liability
25
for the harm they have caused . . . .
What we said, and the point that comes through in this
opinion, is that on this type of nuanced issue, we first looked to our
case law but then checked to see if our case law is “consistent with”
26
the restatement. We concluded that it was consistent.
27
Another case that I can refer to is Larson v. Wasemiller. In
28
Larson, we referenced the restatement. Here is the exact language
we used: “Although we have not specifically adopted this tort, we
have frequently relied on the Restatement of Torts to guide our
development of tort law in areas that we have not previously had an
29
opportunity to address.” We then went on to cite the restatement
and to recognize the tort as an application of the tort of negligent
30
selection of the independent contractor. You can see that the
31
language we use is very favorable to the restatement. In essence,
24. Rowe v. Munye, 702 N.W.2d 729 (Minn. 2005).
25. Id. at 736.
26. See id.
27. 738 N.W.2d 300 (Minn. 2007).
28. Id. at 306, 308.
29. Id. at 306.
30. Id.
31. See id. (noting the court’s frequent reliance on the Restatement of Torts
and casting the material as generally accepted).
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we simply said we will go to the language in the restatement for
32
support even though we have not adopted it specifically. We may
in fact be telling you that we are not going to specifically adopt the
language in the restatement because there is no way that a majority
on our court are going to adopt the restatement in this case.
Nevertheless a majority of us are comfortable with letting the
language in the restatement guide us to a result under our case law
that is consistent with the restatement.
I will now point out some language in a third case. It is Hoyt
33
Properties Inc., v. Production Resource Group, L.L.C., a case that
basically dealt with whether a parent corporation misrepresented
34
35
36
itself. It is a case where the majority and dissent both used the
37
restatement. The majority found support for its position in the
restatement, concluding that two illustrations provided in the
38
restatement supported its position. The dissent talked about the
same illustrations and said that the illustrations do not mean what
39
the majority said they do. The dissent said the majority was using
40
the illustration erroneously. The reason I cite this opinion is so
you can see what we did here. We are not just looking at the black
letter words in the restatement. We are looking at the comments.
We are looking at the illustrations that have been used to explain
the restatement. Further, when we will look to the comments, and
look to the illustrations, we may even disagree, as we did in the Hoyt
case, about how those comments and illustrations should be used.
There is another thing that I want to point out with respect to
the restatement: when the language of the comments changes, we
pay attention to those changes. I do not have the specific case in
front of me today, but I remember looking at the language in the

32.

See id. (noting the court has not adopted the restatement but will rely on

it).
33. 736 N.W.2d 313 (Minn. 2007).
34. See id. at 316–17.
35. Id. at 313–21.
36. Id. at 321–26 (Anderson, P. J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 318, 319, 324.
38. See id. at 318–19 (drawing out the distinction between an illustration of an
expression of opinion, which is legally non-actionable, and an illustration
exemplifying a statement implying facts through a legal opinion, which is
actionable).
39. Id. at 324 (disagreeing with the majority’s understanding and arguing that
both illustrations are legal opinions that may “imply ‘fact[s] susceptible of
knowledge’”).
40. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol37/iss3/10

32

Green et al.: Symposium, Flying Trampolines and Falling Bookcases: Understandin

2011]

TORTS SYMPOSIUM

1051

comments that explained nuanced changes to some language in
the black letter language of the restatement. There was just a
subtle difference in the explanation. But it was a change. I
grabbed onto that change in the comments to help form what was
going on in the one or two word change in the black letter
language of the restatement, and this analysis led us in a particular
direction.
Thus, when you are looking at the restatement, do not just
look at the black letter language in the restatement, pay attention
to how the drafters got there. I can guarantee that if it is a tough
issue for us, I will have my law clerk research the origins of the
41
language. My law clerk, Sarah McBroom, a William Mitchell
graduate who is here with me today, will back me up on this. If it is
an important question, what I will do is say, “Sarah, go back to see
what the comments were. See how they changed. Tell me how
they got to where they are today.” She will then verify the source
and the changes. I always say the most important word in the
vocabulary of any lawyer is the word “why.” Just yesterday, I
reiterated to Sarah that things always happen for a reason. And
our job is to ask why and then find the answer.
42
Lake v. Wal-Mart is another illustrative case that was decided
by our court. The facts of the case are relatively simple. Some
43
female college students had traveled to Mexico for spring break.
While in Mexico, they engaged in a bit of horseplay and one of the
girls took pictures of another girl as she was coming out of the
44
shower. The latter did not have any clothes on when she came
45
out of the shower.
When the photographer returned to
Minnesota, she took the film to the local Wal-Mart store, most likely
46
forgetting about some of the pictures she took. A few months
later, there was a certain buzz of conversation in the community to
the effect of “Have you seen the pictures?,” “Have you seen the
47
pictures from Mexico?”
41. Sarah McBroom graduated from William Mitchell College of Law in 2009,
and clerked for Justice Paul H. Anderson from 2009–2010. In 2010, she received a
Skadden Fellowship to work with the Legal Aid Service of Northeastern
Minnesota.
42. Lake v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 582 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1998).
43. Id. at 232.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 232–33.
47. See id. at 233 (explaining appellants had been asked about the photos and
learned that they were circulated in public).
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What happened is that the young man who was operating the
photo developing machine at Wal-Mart had seen this roll of film,
made a copy of the pictures that interested him, and then shared
48
those pictures with some friends. Once the young lady, whose
picture was taken, learned that the pictures were circulated and
about the sequence of events leading up to their circulation, she
sued Wal-Mart. The question before us was, do we recognize the
tort of invasion of privacy in Minnesota? The chief justice, writing
for the court, drafted an opinion that recognized the tort of
49
invasion of privacy. When doing so, the chief justice cited the
50
restatement and adopted three out of four prongs of the
51
restatement. This is how the law gets developed. Two justices
52
dissented. I was in agreement with the majority even though I had
some reservations that the majority was going too far, too fast. In
any case, Lake v. Wal-Mart is a good case to review when considering
how courts use the restatement to develop tort law.
At this point I will pause for just a bit to explain how the law
gets developed. While the Wal-Mart draft opinion was circulating,
there was another interesting case before our court dealing with
how a trial judge in a Vulnerable Adults Act case should treat the
53
testimony of a victim who had multiple personalities. Which, if
any, personality does the judge allow to testify? I was trying to
figure out how to treat this testimony at the same time I was
reviewing the Wal-Mart case, which by then had been in my
chambers for about ten days. I was quite anxious that Wal-Mart
keep moving through the court and felt a certain degree of
pressure from other court members to keep the opinion moving. I
also remember I was very frustrated by this pressure. Ultimately, I
signed off on the majority opinion in Wal-Mart, but I sometimes
regret doing so because I really wanted to write separately to
question whether we should move so quickly to adopt all three of
the four prongs of the restatement.

48. See id. (explaining appellants friends had been shown the photograph by
a Wal-Mart employee).
49. See id. at 235.
50. Id. at 233 n.2 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977)).
51. 582 N.W.2d at 233.
52. Id. at 236–37.
53. Wall v. Fairview Hosp. and Healthcare Servs., 584 N.W.2d 395 (Minn.
1998).
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Here a statement frequently attributed to Otto Von Bismarck,
the former Chancellor of Germany, is relevant. The statement is
“to retain respect for sausages and laws, one must not watch them
54
in the making.” Remember that courts are human institutions
and are populated by human beings who are fallible and court
decisions are driven by fallible human beings who occupy the
position of judges. In the right to privacy case, I think we could
have developed the law better if we had gone more slowly. This is
especially so when I think back to that conversation I had during
my first year on the court and remember that we should be very
reluctant to adopt new torts and we should move slowly when
adopting them. That said, even if we did move more quickly than I
would have liked in Wal-Mart—the bottom line is that we got it
right when we did adopt the restatement.
Finally, I will cite a couple of other cases. I was reminded of
these cases when listening to Justice Hecht’s comments about how
every case comes to the court in the context of a particular set of
55
facts. Sometimes the facts are ordinary; sometimes they are sad or
56
even tragic. In Bjerke v. Johnson, we had a fact situation where a
young girl loved working with horses, and as a result, sought work
57
at a horse stable. While working at the stable she was sexually
58
abused by one of the stable hands. The facts were sad and tragic.
We were charged with the task of developing a sensible rule of law
within the context of these facts.
Another example of a case with sad facts is Yang v. Voyagaire
59
Houseboats, Inc.
This case involved a situation where a recent
immigrant to the United States who had become successful
organized a family celebration by taking his family on a houseboat
60
trip to Crane Lake.
He rented a houseboat that could
61
accommodate six adults and four children. As you review the facts
in this case you can just feel the family’s excitement about going on
54. It appears that this quote is commonly misattributed to Bismark, and
comes in many different forms, but it is unclear to whom the quote should actually
be attributed. See Marci A. Hamilton, Political Responses to Supreme Court Decisions, 32
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 113, 118 n.24 (2009).
55. Justice Daryl Hecht, Flying Trampolines and Falling Bookcases: Understanding
the Third Restatement of Torts (Spring 2010), 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1025 (2011).
56. 742 N.W.2d 660 (Minn. 2007).
57. Id. at 663.
58. Id.
59. 701 N.W.2d 783 (Minn. 2005).
60. Id. at 786.
61. Id.
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a vacation on a northern Minnesota lake. This is what we consider
to be the good life in Minnesota. But while on the boat, family
62
members suffered carbon monoxide poisoning. Thus, a grand
celebration turned tragic. The question we had to answer is who, if
anyone, was responsible—the party who owned the boat and rented
63
it, or the father who was in charge of the boat once he rented it?
The boat owner had the renter sign a waiver assuming all
64
Did this waiver absolve the owner of all
responsibility.
65
responsibility?
66
Well, we looked to the restatement and concluded that that is
not the way a waiver works under the circumstances. We concluded
67
that the person who rented the boat is like an innkeeper. Then
68
we used the restatement and language that states that an
innkeeper has a duty to his guests to take reasonable action to
69
protect them against an unreasonable risk of harm. Once again,
while we did not specifically adopt the restatement, we looked at it
and used it as a guide. We looked to it and we found it was
consistent with where we wanted to go as we developed our tort law
and it helped us conclude that we adopted the correct legal
principle.
So as the time to conclude my remarks approaches, I will
reflect on my key message to you. What is my bottom line? The
bottom line is that most judges find the restatement quite valuable.
It is very helpful to us. But those of you who are lawyers need to
know how you can most effectively utilize it when you are
presenting to a court like ours, which is a policy-making court. In
this respect, I hope that my remarks today will be helpful to you as
advocates who seek to use the restatement effectively.
Thank you very much.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 786–87.
See id. at 785–86.
Id. at 786–87.
See id. at 789–791.
Id. at 789; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195(2)(b) (1981).
701 N.W.2d at 790.
Id. at 791; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(2) (1965).
701 N.W.2d at 790–91.
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SYMPOSIUM, FLYING TRAMPOLINES AND FALLING
BOOKCASES: UNDERSTANDING THE THIRD
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (SPRING 2010)
By Hildy Bowbeer
1

David Prince : Our next speaker is Hildy Bowbeer, who is the
Assistant Chief Intellectual Property Counsel at 3M, where she
manages intellectual property litigation. Before assuming her
current position, she managed product liability and mass tort
litigation with 3M’s Office of General Counsel. Before she joined
3M, Hildy was a founding partner of the law firm Bowman and
Brooke where she had a national trial and appellate practice doing
product liability defense work. She is an American Law Institute
2
(ALI) member. In addition to the reporters who do the work on
these restatement projects, there are advisory committees who
provide a lot of assistance, and Hildy was an advisor to this
particular Restatement. Her other professional activities include
3
chairing the board of directors at Minnesota CLE, so I get to see
her at our quarterly CLE board meetings. She also chairs the
Mediation and Arbitration Committee of the Intellectual Property
Owner’s Association and is a member of the Governor’s
4
Commission on Judicial Selection. She does a lot of speaking at
seminars and conferences around the country. She is a Michigan
Law graduate, but she’s an Iowa native from Clinton as I recall. So
again, the Iowa influence here is pretty impressive.

1. J. David Prince, Professor of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.
2. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, http://www.ali.org/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2011)
(“The American Law Institute is the leading independent organization in the
United States producing scholarly work to clarify, modernize, and otherwise
improve the law.”).
3. Minnesota CLE is a legal education provider. About Us, MINNESOTA CLE,
http://www.minncle.org/About.aspx (last visited Feb. 24, 2011).
PROPERTY
ASSOCIATION,
4. INTELLECTUAL
http://www.intellectualpropertyassociation.com/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2011); What
is the Commission on Judicial Selection?, MINNESOTA HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/ss/ssjudsel.htm#Q9 (last visited Apr.
9, 2011).
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Hildy Bowbeer: Thank you very much for the opportunity to
speak to you. One of the things that’s fun about this is that it is a
bit of a return to my roots. I’ve been doing intellectual property
litigation for the last nine years, and it’s a treat to be able to come
back to what had been my life for the preceding twenty-two years.
It has been my pleasure for a number of years to get to work
5
with Mike Green in connection with the various ALI projects in
6
which he’s been involved. And, as Mike Steenson and Dave
7
Prince have said, this was a monumental work of scholarship. In
some ways I think it was even more difficult than many restatements
because torts seems like it ought to be so intuitive. Every first year
student in every law school takes torts. We think we know what it
means and how it works. But maybe that “I know it when I see it”
feeling about torts has made it even more difficult to catch it and
pin it down.
So, my first tip, since I’m here talking from the practitioner’s
point of view, is that regardless of what side of the courtroom your
client happens to be sitting on—whether it’s on the plaintiff’s side
or on the defense side—the Third Restatement is an incredible
resource, just for the sheer scholarship and the volume of research
8
that’s incorporated in it.
What I’m going to try to do with these comments for the next
twenty-five minutes or so is not to come at this from a particular
point of view—although my point of view as a corporate attorney
will slip through from time to time—but to be more agnostic in
describing where I think the value of the restatement lies for any
9
practitioner, regardless of the focus of your torts practice.
First, let me return for a moment to the kind of scholarship
10
and research resource that is the Third Restatement. The “black
letter” portion is actually a relatively small part of it; the vast
majority is comprised of the comments and the reporters’ notes.
So no matter what issue you may want to look at—and actually
5. Michael D. Green, Bess and Walter Williams Distinguished Chair and
Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law.
6. Michael K. Steenson, Professor of Law and Kelley Chair in Tort Law,
William Mitchell College of Law.
7. Prince, supra note 1.
8. Referring generally to the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for
Physical and Emotional Harm (2010) project. References to the “Third
Restatement,” unless otherwise made clear, herein refer to the Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm (2010).
9. See id.
10. See id.
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these comments refer not only to this volume, to Physical and
11
Emotional Harm, but to the trilogy of the Third Restatement,
which now includes the Products Liability Restatement from twelve
12
years ago, and the Apportionment Restatement (also the work of
13
14
Mike Green and Bill Powers ) from ten years ago. Regardless of
what kind of torts work you do, you need these volumes in your
library because they are that good a resource.
So that’s tip number one: this is a resource that no good law
library at any law firm should be without. That being said, and I
think all of the speakers here would agree, it ain’t gospel. And
despite the prodigious efforts of the reporters and of the ALI and
its members to leave clients and points of view at the door and
crystallize and articulate the law in an objective fashion, the treatise
that is the Third Restatement has a point of view. Sometimes it has
multiple competing points of view. And so, it has to be read as a
resource, as one way of looking at the law—often an articulate
way—but obviously one that needs to be read thoughtfully and put
in its proper context, like any other resource in the law. And I
think we’ve seen that the Minnesota Supreme Court has tended to
view it that way as well, both with respect to grappling with new
issues and, from time to time, to crystallizing existing issues where
15
it seeks to rationalize a variety of holdings over time.
I think it’s particularly important for every practitioner to
think about these concepts early in your case, not when you’re on
the steps of the Minnesota Supreme Court, or even the court of
appeals. Either you, as lead counsel, or somebody on your team
needs to be tasked with thinking, “what is the law that applies to
this case, and where should the law be going in this area.” At that
critical juncture, and throughout the case, one of the resources you
would be consulting is the restatement to help you crystallize your
thinking as you consider how you might make your case. This is
particularly true if you hope eventually to persuade the court to
take a different approach from the past, or to articulate a vision of
the law in a way it hasn’t done previously. If you wait for appeal,
you have waited too long. You will have, most likely, waived the
11. See id.
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIABILITY (1997).
13. William Powers, Jr., President and Hines H. Baker and Thelma Kelley
Baker Chair in Law, University of Texas at Austin.
14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIAB. (2000).
15. Paul H Anderson, Flying Trampolines and Falling Bookcases: Understanding
the Third Restatement of Torts (Spring 2010), 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1042 (2011).
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issues. And you certainly can’t expect that the court in most cases
will be reaching outside the bounds of the record below and doing
that thinking for you. This is not to say it never happens that way.
There were cases I experienced when I clerked for the Minnesota
Supreme Court where the court thought both parties had missed
the boat, and it reached out to look for an alternative way of
thinking. But in general, it is your responsibility to think early and
often about where the law ought to be going. And the restatement
is one place to go to help you pull that together and to help you
support another point of view.
Jury instructions are one of the areas where the restatement
can come in handy. In Minnesota, we are blessed with the finest set
of jury instruction guides of any state in the country, and Mike
16
17
Steenson can take a huge amount of credit for that. They are
thoughtful, well-supported, and relatively easy for ordinary jurors to
understand. But they cannot possibly cover everything. So, one of
the important things in any case is to look at what jury instructions
you want to request, either because you need to fill in around the
edges of the existing instructions, or because you expect you will be
urging the court eventually to adopt a different approach to the
law. In both instances, you may well need to make that request in
the form of a jury instruction.
Furthermore, apart from
considerations of preserving these legal positions for appeal, I can
tell you from experience that jury instructions matter to the jury.
The words matter. So for all of these reasons, you should not wait
until you are up on appeal to begin thinking about what standards
the jury should have applied when they considered your case. That
is simply too late. Thus, to the extent you can turn to a resource
like the restatement to help you think about what to communicate
to the jury about the standards you want it to apply to your case,
and how to communicate that in a way that makes sense, that is a
very real value the restatement can bring long before the appeal,
and one you should not forgo.
Mike Green pointed out in his comments that there were
some portions of the Restatement that were especially
18
controversial, and he correctly identified the one that I think is
16. Steenson, supra note 6.
17. Michael D. Steenson has co-authored the JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES
CIVIL—MINNESOTA PRACTICE SERIES (5th ed. 2000) with Peter B. Knapp, Professor
of Law, William Mitchell College of Law.
18. Michael D. Green, Flying Trampolines and Falling Bookcases: Understanding
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the most troubling to a number of us who were actively involved
19
with this project—comment c to section 28, which discusses at
some length an approach to dealing with issues of general and
specific causation in toxic torts cases.
There are a couple of things that are troubling about section
28—and I’m not saying anything here that I and others have not
20
already shared with Mike.
First, I think this comment—the
subject matter of the comment—did not belong in the Third
Restatement. Setting aside my disagreement with the position
taken in comment c, I think it’s a discussion that belongs more
appropriately in the Federal Judicial Center’s Reference Manual on
21
Scientific Evidence or, perhaps, in a restatement on evidence or a
restatement on expert evidence, but not in a restatement of torts. I
think comment c delves into issues of scientific proof and the
admissibility of scientific evidence and expert opinion in a way that
simply was not appropriate to the scope of this project.
Second, and more troubling, this comment ventures into a
dangerous area far beyond anything supported by the case law or
by the very underpinnings of tort law. It suggests that if litigation
about a particular substance happens to occur before there is a
body of rigorous scientific evidence on causation, then it might be
okay for a court to relax its vigilance in its role as gatekeeper for
22
expert evidence.
In other words, comment c suggests that in
these cases, it might be appropriate for the court to let in whatever
proof happens to be available and let the jury sort it out. It even
goes so far as to suggest that a court might consider shifting the
burden of proof to the defendant when the plaintiff lacks rigorous
proof that the substance at issue was capable of causing the
23
plaintiff’s illness or injury.
Now, in Minnesota, we are blessed with juries that, by and
large, are savvy when it comes to poor science, junk science, or
good science. But query whether the case ought to get that far in
the first place. So, to the extent comment c to section 28 could be
read to suggest that the court shift the burden of proof to the
the Third Restatement of Torts (Spring 2010), 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1011 (2011).
19. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
28 cmt. c (2010).
20. Green, supra note 18.
21. See generally REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2nd ed. 2000).
22. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 28 cmt. c (2010).
23. See id.
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defendant when rigorous scientific evidence is not available, it
takes a profoundly troubling turn away from a principled
interpretation of the law and from the appropriate role for a
restatement. It is also, in my opinion, wrong-headed legal thinking
and poor public policy.
Finally, I wanted to talk a little about some of the issues that
25
26
Mike Green and Mike Steenson have already discussed with
respect to foreseeability, the scope of liability, and the role of duty.
I’ll take as an example—because it was an example that I spent
time with in my product liability practice—the issue of duty to
warn. This is an area where the Third Restatement and the way it
approaches duty and causation may be both consistent with
Minnesota law and useful in recasting it in a construct that makes
more sense. For example, think about Minnesota precedent that
says duty is for the court to decide, and as a matter of law there is
27
no duty to warn of an obvious or well-known risk. Naturally, as an
attorney who defends product manufacturers, I think that is a
pretty good rule. Actually, I think it is a good rule for consumers as
well. A consumer should not want manufacturers plastering
products with warnings about obvious or well-known risks. Thus, it
makes intuitive sense that a manufacturer should not be held liable
for failing to provide a written warning about an obvious risk.
But although this outcome is intuitively and practically correct,
28
is this really a duty issue, as Minnesota law tends to cast it? While it
seems appropriate for the court to decide that the law does not
require warnings about obvious risks, does casting this issue in
terms of “duty” mean that the court must also resolve as a matter of
law whether there was a “duty” to provide a warning in other, more
factually ambiguous circumstances? That would be a natural
extension of the “duty” framework, and yet it puts the court in the
traditional role of the jury, resolving issues of fact.
The Third Restatement gives us some opportunities to recast
this issue to get to the same intuitively correct result, but in a way
that may even make more sense. A court applying the Third
24. See id.
25. Green, supra note 18.
26. Steenson, supra note 6.
27. See, e.g., Frey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 258 N.W.2d 782, 786 (Minn.
1977); Clark v. Rental Equip. Co. Inc., 300 Minn. 420, 220 N.W.2d 507 (Minn.
1974); Westerberg v. Sch. Dist. No. 792, Todd Cnty., 276 Minn. 1, 9, 148 N.W.2d
312, 317 (1967).
28. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 27.
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Restatement’s approach to duty can recognize generally a duty of
reasonable care to provide warnings, leaving it to the jury in most
cases to determine whether under all the circumstances reasonable
care would have required a warning of a particular risk in
connection with a particular product. But how, then, are courts to
reconcile this with established Minnesota law that manufacturers
29
will not be held liable for choosing not to warn of obvious risks?
30
One path, as Mike Green pointed out, is that the Third
31
Restatement tells us there can be limits on duty for policy reasons.
Thus, one way the court can look at this is simply to say: we have
decided as a matter of policy there should be no duty to warn of
32
obvious risks, that limited real estate on products ought to be
devoted to risks people are not likely to know about. An alternative
path for the court, equally consistent with the Third Restatement,
would be to approach it from a summary judgment perspective as a
simple question of factual cause—that if this plaintiff ignored this
obvious risk, no reasonable jury could conclude the plaintiff would
have observed and heeded a written warning about that risk.
In other words, there are ways the restatement can help us
crystallize issues and principles that have been fuzzy or difficult to
articulate. It may give us a way to get to results that have always
seemed intuitively correct, but with a sensible construct that can
help us characterize and develop the law going forward.
The last caveat I would offer—and this is true for every
restatement—is that for all of its wonderful qualities, you have to be
careful not to mine it for sound bites. The comments of this and
all restatements are densely packed. There’s a lot of explanation, a
lot of qualification, a lot of context. So as you are looking at it and
thinking “how can I use this and how should the courts use this to
advance the law in a sensible but rational way,” you have to be
careful not to take a sentence here or there out of context. That
has happened with prior restatements, and I think it is always a risk.
For example, in section 402(a) of the Restatement (Second) of
33
Torts —which at the time was the only section of any restatement
that addressed product liability—there was one statement in one

29. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 27.
30. Green, supra note 18.
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
7(b) (2010).
32. See id.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402(a) (1965).
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comment dealing with product defects that a manufacturer could
34
assume an adequate warning would be heeded. In the context of
the full comment, it made sense. But taken out of that context,
that statement was turned on its head and morphed into what, in
many states (although not, thankfully, Minnesota), became a
causation-skipping presumption in failure to warn cases: that the
plaintiff would have seen, read, and heeded a warning, even where
there is no evidence that a warning of any kind would have been
effective. It is an example of how taking a comment or a fragment
of a comment out of context can lead to some unintended and, I
believe, dangerous results.
Overall though, as I said at the beginning, I would suggest that
every lawyer who wants to practice in the area of torts ought to own
this work, ought to spend some time with it, and ought to be
thinking about how to use it in conjunction with established
Minnesota law to make the law make sense for that next jury and
that next appellate judge. I congratulate Mike Green and Bill
Powers for their outstanding work product, and thank them for the
privilege of being associated with it.
Thank you.

34.

Id. at cmt. j.
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